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FOURTH AMENDMENT-A RENEWED
PLEA FOR RELEVANT CRITERIA FOR
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF TAINTED
CONFESSIONS
Taylor v. Alabama, 102 S. Ct. 2664 (1982).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Taylor v. Alabama, Ithe United States Supreme Court, in a five to
four decision,2 held a defendant's confession to be the "fruit" of an ille-
gal arrest, and hence inadmissible at his trial3 under Brown v. linois4
and Dunaway v. New York. 5 The Court split over the proper application
of the rules set forth in Brown when determining whether the police had
purposefully exploited the illegal arrest to induce the confession, or
whether the taint of the illegal arrest had become so attenuated as to
purge the confession.6 Applying the Brown test, the Court held that a
confession given while a defendant is in police custody is inadmissible
when it is obtained six hours after the illegal arrest, when no intervening
events have ocurred, and when the police engineered the illegal arrest
for investigatory purposes.7
Because the Taylor decision turns on its facts, it provides few, if any,
manageable guidelines for consistent application of the Brown test.
Thus, the decision leaves lower courts with substantial latitude to deter-
mine when the Brown test should be invoked, and how much weight
should be accorded to each of its factors. This has encouraged some
courts to utterly disregard the Brown test, and admit tainted confessions
notwithstanding prior police illegality, under the rubric of a "good
faith" exception to the exclusionary rule.8
1 102 S. Ct. 2664 (1982).
2 Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Brennan, White,
Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice O'Connor filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice
Burger, Justice Powell, and Justice Rehnquist joined.
3 102 S. Ct. at 2669.
4 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
5 442 U.S. 200 (1979).
6 102 S. Ct. at 2667 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 602).
7 102 S. Ct. at 2667-68.
8 See United States v. Williams, 662 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
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ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS
Confessions, as well as other evidence, which result from an illegal
arrest, are suppressed in order to effectuate the fourth amendment 9
guarantee against illegal searches and seizures.'° The premise underly-
ing the exclusionary rule is that the police will be deterred from violat-
ing the fourth amendment if illegally obtained evidence is excluded
from use at trial." Effective deterrence, however, requires clear stan-
dards of acceptable police behavior and infallible exclusion when those
standards are breached. The Taylor Court's failure to provide clear and
manageable guidelines for the exclusion of improperly obtained confes-
sions perpetuates uncertainty of application which is inconsistent with
effective deterrence; hence, the fourth amendment guarantee against il-
legal searches and seizures is undermined.
II. FACTS OF TAYLOR
On the basis of an unsupported tip, and without a warrant or prob-
able cause,' 2 Alabama police arrested Omar Taylor for robbing a gro-
cery store. The officers told Taylor why he was being arrested and gave
him the warnings required under Miranda v. Arizona.' 3 At the police sta-
tion, Taylor again received Miranda warnings, and he signed an
acknowlegement to that effect. The police fingerprinted him and placed
him in a lineup, but he was not indentified by the victims of the rob-
bery. Meanwhile, the police had determined that Taylor's fingerprints
matched those on grocery items handled by the robbers. When they
informed him of this fact, Taylor denied knowledge of the robbery. The
police then filed an ex parte warrant for Taylor's arrest, based on the
fingerprint analysis.' 4
9 The pertinent part of the fourth amendment states: "The right of the people to be
secure in their persons. . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
10 "The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can
destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its
disregard of the charter of its own existence." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 659 (1961).
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against
a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his
right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those
placed are concerned, might as well be striken from the Constitution.
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 83, 393 (1914).
11 The exclusionary rule is designed "to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional
guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."
367 U.S. at 656 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960)).
12 During a police investigation Charles Martin, incarcerated on an unrelated charge of
rape and a suspect in the robbery of the grocery store, told the police that he had heard that
Omar Taylor was involved in the robbery. Martin did not offer any support for the accusa-
tion, and the police admitted to making no effort to ascertain the reliability of the tip. 102 S.
Ct. at 2670 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
13 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
'4 102 S. Ct. at 2669.
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Almost six hours after the arrest, a detective again advised Taylor
of his Miranda rights, and again had him sign an acknowledgment.
Though advised to cooperate, Taylor remained adamant in his denials.
Shortly thereafter, Taylor met with his girlfriend and a male companion
in the detective's office. 15 After the meeting, Taylor signed a waiver-of-
rights form and confessed to his involvement in the robbery of the gro-
cery store.
At trial, Taylor moved to suppress the confession, arguing that it
was the tainted "fruit" of the illegal arrest. The trial court denied the
motion and Taylor was convicted. The Court of Criminal Appeals of
Alabama reversed, holding that the causal connection between the ini-
tial police illegality and the confession had not been severed, and hence
that the confession was not admissible under the rule of Brown v. Illi-
nois.' 6 The Supreme Court of Alabama in turn reversed, reinstating the
trial court verdict. It held that the confession was admissible because
after the illegal arrest there had been a finding of probable cause, based
on the fingerprint comparison, which broke the causal connection be-
tween the illegal arrest and the confession.17
III. CONTROLLING LAW
Any evidence which the police discover, directly or indirectly, as a
result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible under the "fruit of
the poisonous tree" doctrine.t 8 The initially seized evidence (or the ille-
gal search of a seized person) represents the "poisonous tree." All evi-
dence subsequently derived from the illegally seized evidence is the
"fruit" of the poisonous tree insofar as it has been tainted by the initial
official illegality.19 Under the exclusionary rule both primary and sec-
ondary evidence obtained in this manner is inadmissible in criminal
prosecutions.
The exclusionary rule, while not an explicit requirement of the
Constitution, 20 is a judicially created tool invoked to effectuate two re-
lated fourth amendment policy objectives: deterrence of unlawful police
15 It is not clear from the record whether they were alone or whether a policeman was
present, nor is it certain whether the meeting was arranged by the police or if it was Taylor's
own idea. Moreover, there is some controversy as to what actually transpired at the meeting.
102 S. Ct. at 2668 n.1; id. at 2670 n.2 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
16 Taylor v. State, 399 So. 2d 875, 880 (Ala. Crim. App. 1980), rev'd, 399 So. 2d 881
(1981), rev'dsub nor., Taylor v. Alabama, 102 S. Ct. 2664 (1982).
17 Taylor v. State, 399 So. 2d 881, 884-85 (Ala. 1981), rev'd sub nom., Taylor v. Alabama,
102 S. Ct. 2664 (1982).
18 Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939).
19 Id.




misconduct and preservation of judicial integrity.2' The Court
originated the exclusionary rule in Boyd v. United States, 22 holding that
the federal government could not use illegally seized evidence in a crimi-
nal trial.23 The rule that derivative evidence is also tainted emerged in
Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States.24 The Court there held that all
evidence derived from illegally seized evidence must likewise be ex-
cluded,25 unless such derivative evidence would have been discovered
inevitably, notwithstanding the official illegality, or if it was received
from a collateral source unrelated to the official illegality.26 Later, in
Nardone v. United States,27 Justice Frankfurter characterized evidence
tainted by official illegality as the "fruit of the poisonous tree," 28 and
held that all such evidence must be excluded unless "[a]s a matter of
good sense . . .such connection [between the illegal seizure and the
proffered evidence] may have become so attenuated as to dissipate the
taint." 29
In Wong Sun v. United States,30 the Court included verbal evidence
under the umbrella of the exclusionary rule. Previously, if confessions
were voluntary for the purpose of the fifth amendment, they were ad-
missible notwithstanding any prior police illegality.3 1 In extending the
exclusionary rule to verbal evidence, the Wong Sun Court noted:
21 Seegenral4y Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960) ("The rule is calculated to
prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is to deter-to compel respect for the constitutional guar-
anty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incentive to disregard it."). The
rule preserves judicial integrity, since the admission of tainted evidence would be tantamount
to condoning the illegal methods of its procurement. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 486 (1963). See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting), rev'd on other grounds, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Comment,
Judicial Integrity andJudicial Review: An Argument for Expanding the Scope of the Excluionary Rule,
20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1129 (1973).
22 116 U.S. 616 (1886). See also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
23 The Court in Boyd acknowledged the close nexus between the fourth and fifth amend-
ments: "The 'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the Fourth Amendment are
almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself,
which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment .... 116 U.S. at 633.
24 251 U.S. 385 (1919).
25 Id. at 392.
26 Id.
27 308 U.S. 338 (1939).
28 The Nardone Court indicated that a trial court should examine carefully the causal
connection between an illegal arrest and evidence obtained subsequently, but proposed no
specific guidelines for establishing attenuation of the taint of the illegal arrest. Id. at 341.
29 Id.
30 371 U.S. 471 (1963). In Wong Sun one of the defendants, Toy, made an incriminating
statement shortly after federal agents illegally forced their way into his home. The Court
ruled that Toy's inculpatory statements must be suppressed as the fruit of the agents' illegal
actions. Toy's confession, however, led agents to Wong Sun, the other defendant in the case.
31 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961); Smith v. United States, 254 F.2d 751,
758 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Balbo v. People, 80 N.Y. 484, 499 (1880).
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[T]he policies underlying the exclusionary rule [do not] invite any logical
distinction between physical and verbal evidence. Either in terms of deter-
ring lawless conduct by federal officers . . or of closing the doors of the
federal courts to any use of evidence unconstitutionally obtained . . . the
danger in relaxing the exclusionary rules in the case of verbal evidence
would seem too great to warrant introducing such a distinction. 32
The Court held that Wong Sun's arrest was illegal because it resulted
from his co-defendant's tainted confession. The Court also found that
Wong Sun's release from police custody for several days and his volun-
tary return to confess, however, broke the presumption of a causal con-
nection between the illegal arrest and the confession. 33
Thus, the Court in Wong Sun not only included verbal evidence in
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, but also identified a determina-
tive factor attenuating the primary taint: the release of a defendant
from police custody. The Wong Sun Court eschewed the notion that all
verbal evidence stemming from an illegal arrest should necessarily be
excluded from evidence at trial.3 4 Though there is a presumption that
the illegal arrest is the cause of a subsequent confession, the presumption
is rebuttable under Wong Sun if the confession is the result of "an inter-
vening. . . act of a free will."' 35 The failure of the Court in Wong Sun to
define specific criteria for determining attenuation of the primary taint,
however, left state and federal courts free to adopt widely differing
thresholds of attenuation.3 6
32 371 U.S. at 486. The Court's insistence in Wong Sun that there should be no distinction
between verbal and tangible evidence created some immediate confusion. See, e.g., Collins v.
Beto, 348 F.2d 823, 835 (5th Cir. 1965) (Friendly, J., concurring):
IT]he connection between the unconstitutional intrusion and the booty offered at trial is
so automatic and inevitable that the latter is readily seen as the 'fruit' of the unconstitu-
tional act. But when the object improperly seized is a person and the alleged 'fruit' is a
statement by him, there intervenes the individual's own decision to speak.
33 371 U.S. at 491.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 486.
36 One line of cases considered the voluntariness of the defendant's statement, tending to
admit the confession as an act of the defendant's free will notwithstanding the prior illegality.
Ralph v. Peppersack, 335 F.2d 128 (4th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 925 (1965); Hollings-
worth v. United States, 321 F.2d 342 (10th Cir. 1963); People v. Novak, 33 Ill. 2d 343, 211
N.E.2d 235 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1016 (1966). Another line of decisions broadly ex-
cluded all confessions made subsequent to illegal arrests in order to advance the deterrent role
of the exclusionary rule. Gatlin v. United States, 326 F.2d 666, 672 (D.C. Cir. 1963); People
v. Sesslin, 68 Cal. 2d 418, 439 P.2d 321, 67 Cal. Rptr. 409 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1080
(1969); State v. Thompson, 1 Ohio App. 2d 533, 206 N.E.2d 5 (1965). See Comment, The
Fourth Amendment and Tainted Confessions: Admissibility as a Poli Decision, 13 Hous. L. REV.
753, 759-60 (1976). "The split of authorities following Wong Sun occurred because the Court
failed to specify the weight to be given each factor in determining admissibility. Some courts
have refused to consider either factor exclusively; as a result admissibility has hinged on a
balancing of several considerations." Id. at 760.
ADMISSIBILITY OF CONFESSIONS
In Brown v. llinois,37 the Court attempted to coalesce the holding of
Wong Sun into a multifactor test for determining when the taint of an
illegal arrest has become so attenuated as to purge the confession. At
the same time, however, it acknowledged the need for a flexible applica-
tion of the exclusionary rule.38 In Brown, without probable cause or a
warrant, the police had entered Brown's apartment, searched it, and
then arrested him when he returned home. 39 They gave Brown his Mi-
randa warnings. At the station, the police confronted Brown with infor-
mation about a shooting they were investigating, and within two hours
of his illegal arrest, Brown confessed to the crime.40 The Court in Brown
rejected the Illinois Supreme Court holding that Miranda warnings alone
purge the taint of an illegal arrest, and eschewed the adoption of any
alternative per se rule.4t
Instead, the Court set forth three factors for courts to consider when
determining whether the taint of an illegal arrest has become so attenu-
ated as to purge the confession. The first of these factors is the temporal
proximity of the illegal arrest and the confession.42 Brown had been in
police custody for only two hours when he confessed. Though the Court
did not directly relate this fact to the issue of temporal proximity, 43 such
a brief detention would appear to raise the inference that sufficient time
had not passed to permit attenuation of the taint of the illegal arrest.
The second factor the Brown Court isolated is the presence of interven-
ing circumstances. 44 In Brown, the giving of Miranda warnings did not
constitute sufficient intervention to purge the taint.45 The final factor
set forth by the Court in Brown is the "purpose and flagrancy" of the
37 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
38 The Court expressed its desire for a flexible application of the exclusionary rule as early
as 1928 in Nardone v. United States: "Such a system as ours must, within the limits here indi-
cated, rely on the learning, good sense, fairness, and courage of federal trial judges. . . . The
civilized conduct of criminal trials cannot be confined within mechanical rules." 308 U.S. at
342.
39 422 U.S. at 592. The police had obtained Brown's name from the victim's brother as
an acquaintance of the victim, not as a suspect.
40 Id. at 595.
41 Id. at 603. ("No single fact is dispositive. The workings of the human mind are too
complex, and the possibilities of misconduct too diverse, to permit protection of the Fourth
Amendment to turn on such a talismanic test.").
42 Id.
43 The Court in Brown considered only the question of whether Miranda warnings per se
purge the taint of an illegal arrest. Though it set out the multifactor test for determining
whether attenuation has occurred, it never actually applied the test to the facts of the case. In
fact, the Court limited its holding to the facts of the case and the issue of Miranda warnings.
Id. at 605.
44 Id. at 604.
45 Id. See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (when a defendant is represented by
counsel and brought before a magistrate for a determination of probable cause and appropri-
ate bail, the primary taint of the illegal arrest is purged).
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official misconduct.4 6 The Court found that the police, with informa-
tion far less than probable cause, arrested Brown for investigatory pur-
poses only. Thus, the underlying sense of purposefulness strongly
demonstrated serious police misconduct. The Court also considered, to
a lesser degree, the manner of Brown's arrest, which was "calculated to
cause surprise, fright, and confusion. '47
The Court in Brown did not delineate the relationship among these
factors to set forth a clear test of when taint of an illegal arrest may
become purged. Rather, the Court explicitly acknowledged that its ap-
proach relies to a large degree upon judicial discretion.48 It is clear from
Brown that exclusion of a confession is almost certain where flagrant and
purposeful police conduct has occurred; the deterrence rationale of the
exclusionary rule demands that much, as does the preservation of judi-
cial integrity. Still, Brown left unresolved the question of whether con-
fessions should be excluded if the police misconduct was technical or
non-purposeful.49 Further, since there were no intervening circum-
stances in Brown, the decision did not establish a standard of what con-
stitutes a sufficient intervening cause; it merely acknowledged the
findings of intervention in Wong Sun and Johnson v. Lousiana.50
The Court in Dunaway v. New York 5' found the facts there to be
virtually indentical to those in Brown ,52 and accordingly applied the
Brown multifactor test. Finding that the temporal proximity between
the defendant's illegal arrest and the confession was only two hours, that
there were no significant intervening circumstances, and that the police
acted with an attitude of purposefulness, the Court in Dunaway excluded
the confession. 53 It reaffirmed Brown's holding that Miranda warnings
alone do not purge the taint of an illegal arrest, but it did not clarify the
factors of temporal proximity and intervening circumstances. It did,
however, narrow the interpretation of the official misconduct, determin-
ing that this factor is relevant only in terms of the flagrancy of the fourth
amendment violation, not in terms of the manner in which the illegal
arrest is accomplished. 54
46 422 U.S. at 604.
47 Id. at 605.
48 Id. at 604 n.10. See supra note 38.
49 See Comment, supra note 36, at 767-70.
50 406 U.S. 356 (1972). See supra notes 30 & 45 and accompanying text.
51 442 U.S. 200 (1979). The Court in Dunaway primarily considered the legality of the
defendant's detention. Having determined that the detention was illegal, it applied the Brown
test cursorily.
52 Id. at 218 ("The situation in this case is virtually a replica of the situation in Brown.").
53 Id. at 218-19.
54 Id. See Note, Fourth Amendment-Admissib/ity oStatements Obtained During Illegal Detention,
70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 446, 457 (1979).
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In 1980, the Court in Rawlings v. Kentucky55 applied the Brown test
in dicta. While subjected to an illegal detention and search, the peti-
tioner admitted to owning illegal drugs. The petitioner subsequently
claimed that his admission should be suppressed as the fruit of his illegal
detention. 56 The Court applied the first factor of the Brown test, tempo-
ral proximity, and noted that only forty-five minutes had elapsed be-
tween the arrest and the admission. Determining that this by itself was
inconclusive, 57 the Court proceeded to the factor of intervening circum-
stances. Because the defendant confessed to the ownership of the drugs
contemporaneously with the discovery of the drugs, Justice Rehnquist
concluded for the majority that the confession was motivated by the
intervening event of the discovery of the drugs themselves and not the
illegal arrest. 58 Justice Rehnquist gave the least weight to the purpose
and flagrancy of the police misconduct: "The conduct of the police here
does not rise to the level of conscious or flagrant misconduct requiring
prophylactic exclusion of petitioner's statements. '59
The Court's decision in Rawlings cast a shadow of ambiguity upon
the holdings in Brown and Dunaway. Nowhere in Brown or Dunaway did
the Court suggest that the absence of conscious flagrancy on the part of
the police should, in itself, lead to the admission of confessions made
subsequent to an illegal arrest. Insofar as the Court in Rawlings deter-
mined that the arrest and detention of the defendant was legal, its deci-
sion on the admissibility of the confession was dicta. Also, since the
search which lead to the discovery of the drugs directly resulted from the
initial illegality, it could hardly be construed thereafter as an independ-
ent intervening event which "contributed to [petitioner's] ability to con-
sider carefully his . . .options and . . .excercise his free will." 60 The
Court's dicta in Rawlings raises even greater confusion in that if the ar-
rest and detention of the defendent were illegal, then the subsequent
search was tainted. Thus, the defendant's admission, which resulted
55 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
56 The police entered the defendant's home pursuant to a valid arrest warrant for one
Marquess. They did not find him there. While searching for him, however, the police
smelled marijuana, and two of the officers left to get a search warrant. The remaining officers
detained the occupants. When the officers returned with the search warrant, they read the
occupants their Miranda rights. The police emptied a purse and discovered illegal drugs. The
defendant admitted to ownership of the drugs. The police searched the defendant, and then
arrested him. Though the Court found that the detention and search were lawful, they dis-
cussed the admissibility of the tainted confession in arguendo. Id. at 100-10.
57 A forty-five minute interval should probably raise a strong presumption of taint since
the interval in both Brown and Dunaway was only two hours. See infia text accompanying
notes 63-64.
58 448 U.S. at 108.
59 Id. at 110 (emphasis added).
60 102 S. Ct. at 2668.
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from the disclosure of drugs found during the search, was thereby
tainted, and inadmissible. 61 The Raw/'ng Court's application of the
Brown test in dicta is inconsistent with the holding in Brown and the
policies underlying the exclusionary rule.
IV. OPINIONS IN TAYLOR
In Taylor, five members of the Court relied exclusively upon Brown
and Dunaway when arriving at their decision to suppress the confession
of Omar Taylor. Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, applied
Brown's multifactor test to determine whether Taylor's confession re-
sulted from police exploitation of the illegal arrest, or whether the taint
of the illegal arrest had become so attenuated as to purge the confession
and render it admissible for the purposes of the fourth amendment. 62
The temporal proximity of the illegal arrest and the confession is
the most ambiguous of the three factors of the Brown test, 63 and the
Court declined to hold that the six hour detention by itself was sufficient
to attenuate the taint of the illegal arrest. Though Brown and Dunaway
each involved only two-hour detentions, "a difference of a few hours is
not significant where, as here, petitioner was in police custody, unrepre-
sented by counsel, fingerprinted . . . and subjected to a lineup. '6 4
Thus, temporal proximity by itself will rarely prove sufficient attenua-
tion; rather, it is the quality of the detention and the presence of inter-
vening events which are determinative. 65 The majority's cursory
disposition of the temporal proximity factor indicated their dissatisfac-
tion with it as a reliable indicator of attenuation.
The Taylor majority also followed Brown in weighing the factor of
intervening circumstances which might break the causal connection be-
tween the illegal arrest and the confession. Possible intervening circum-
stances in Taylor included repeated Miranda warnings. The Taylor
majority reaffirmed the reasoning set forth in Brown that Miranda warn-
ings address the fifth amendment issue of voluntariness, and that a
"finding of 'voluntariness' for purposes of the Fifth Amendment is
merely a threshold requirement for Fourth Amendment analysis."'66
61 See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969) (fingerprints obtained during an illegal
detention were not admitted into evidence at trial).
62 102 S. Ct. at 2667.
63 442 U.S. at 220 (Stevens, J., concurring).
64 102 S. Ct. at 2668.
65 442 U.S. at 220 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("If there are no relevant intervening circum-
stances, a prolonged detention may well be a more serious exploitation of an illegal arrest
than a short one. Conversely, even an immediate confession may have been motivated by a
prearrest event .... .
66 102 S. Ct. at 2668. Justice Marshall further discounted the intervention effect of giving
A'f4iranda warnings, quoting Mapp v. Ohio: "If Miranda warnings were viewed as a talisman
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While the Brown Court had found Miranda warnings an important al-
though not a conclusive factor in determining attenuation, the Taylor
majority considered them virtually irrelevant. 67
The majority also rejected the contention that Taylor's visit with
his girlfriend and a male companion was an intervening event which
broke the chain of causation between the illegal arrest and the confes-
sion. Justice Marshall declared that an intervening event will only
break the chain of causation when it "contributed to [the defendant's]
ability to consider carefully . . .his options and to exercise his free
will."68 This indicates that the event must, in effect, dissipate the aura of
coercion surrounding the illegal arrest; it cannot simply substitute one
source of coercion for another. The majority also held that the ex parte
warrant, filed after Taylor's arrest and based upon the comparison of
Taylor's fingerprints with those found at the scene of the crime, did not
purge the taint of the illegal arrest. Because the fingerprints themselves
were the fruit of the illegal arrest, the police could not use them to purge
the taint of the initial illegality.6
9
Lastly, the majority addressed the third factor of the Brown test:
the flagrancy and purposefulness of the official misconduct. As in Duna-
way, the majority applied this factor in terms of the flagrancy of the
fourth amendment violation, not in terms of whether the defendant was
subjected to intimidating police misconduct thereafter.70 Since the po-
lice arrested Taylor without a warrant or probable cause, and for purely
investigatory reasons, the Court found that the official misconduct was
flagrant.
71
In her dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justices Powell and Rehnquist, pointed out that Taylor's
arrest was neither violent, nor designed to "cause surprise, fright, and
confusion."'72 Justice O'Connor argued that this absence of police cul-
that cured all Fourth Amendment violations, then the constitutional guarantee against un-
lawful searches and seizures would be reduced to a mere 'form of words.'" Id. at 2668 (quot-
ing 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961)).
67 The rationale behind this, though it is not clearly articulated by the Court, is that
Miranda warnings are given to protect a defendant's fifth amendment right against self-in-
crimination, while the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to effectuate the underlying policies
of the fourth amendment by deterring the police from engaging in illegal searches and
seizures. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
68 102 S. Ct. at 2668. See id. at 2668 n.1.
69 Id. at 2669. See, e.g., Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 727 (1969) ("Detentions for the
sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints are no less subject to the constraints of the Fourth
Amendment.').
70 102 S. Ct. at 2669 ("In this case, as in Dunaway, the police effectuated an investigatory
arrest. . . in the hope that something would turn up. The fact that the police did not physi-
cally abuse petitioner. . . does not cure the illegality of the initial arrest.").
71 Id.
72 Id. at 2672 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting 422 U.S. at 605).
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pability should be weighed in favor of admission of the confession.
Notwithstanding the Dunaway Court's rejection of the relevance of the
manner in which the illegal arrest is accomplished, Justice O'Connor
seemed to suggest that good faith on the part of the police should mili-
tate against suppression of the evidence. 73 In response, the majority sim-
ply commented that it would not at this time recognize a "good faith"
exception to the exclusionary rule.74
The dissent chiefly disagreed with the majority's interpretation of
the facts. 75 Justice O'Connor also disagreed with the thresholds that the
majority attached to the factors of the Brown test. The dissent con-
tended that the majority erred in failing to consider the three Miranda
warnings given to Taylor, since Brown had held Miranda warnings to be
an important factor in the analysis. 76 Further, the dissent construed the
visit of the girlfriend and the male companion as an intervening event
which broke the chain of causation, because Taylor's confession fol-
lowed hard on the heels of that visit. 77 Finally, the dissent implied that,
because Taylor was alone during most of his six hours in detention, 78
while in Brown and in Dunaway the defendants had been interrogated
throughout their detentions until they confessed, Taylor's confession was
not obtained by exploitation of his illegal arrest. 79 The dissent then ac-
cused the majority of applying the three factors of the Brown test sepa-
rately rather than cumulatively, thereby ignoring the context of the case
as a whole.80
V. ANALYSIS AND RAMIFICATIONS
Since Wong Sun 8t the Court has applied the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine on a case-by-case basis. The Brown test, which was sup-
posed to coalesce the factors of attenuation into a precise and practical
test, still requires the trial court to make an implicit judgment about the
efficacy of the exclusionary rule before it can apply the test. The Court's
adoption of the Brown test in Dunaway without further clarification per-
petuated the confusion over the proper standards of attenuation neces-
73 Id. ("[I]n contrast to the facts in Brown, the facts in the present case show that the
petitioner was not subjected to intimidating police misconduct.").
74 Id. at 2669.
75 Id. at 2670 n.2 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[I]n an effort to support its holding, the
Court has parsed through the petitioner's story and plucked those tidbits that the police did
not expressly contradict.").
76 Id. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
77 Id. at 2672 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
78 Id. at 2673 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
79 Id.
80 Id. at 2673 n.7 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
81 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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sary to purge the taint of official illegality. The Taylor majority's failure
to provide substantive guidelines as to how much weight each of the
factors of the Brown test should be accorded will surely exacerbate the
vagaries surrounding the notion of attenuation.
The absence of clear standards has encouraged courts to marshal
facts according to their perception of the police misconduct and the effi-
cacy of the exclusionary rule in deterring it. The fifth circuit's adoption
of a "good faith" exception poses an extreme example. The "good
faith" exception provides for the admission of illegally obtained evi-
dence if the police had acted upon a reasonable good faith belief that
their actions were proper.8 2 Such attempts to eviscerate the exclusion-
ary rule by undermining its deterrent effect through the use of the good
faith exception will not be stemmed by the Court's decison in Tlor.
The fourth amendment's protection against illegal searches and seizures
will become unenforceable without the deterrent arm of the exclusion-
ary rule. The Taylor decision does uphold the exclusionary rule insofar
as it ruled against the admission of a confession tainted by official ille-
gality. Yet, it allows so much flexibility in determining the sufficiency of
attenuation that it has virtually granted "home rule" to the state and
federal courts to assign their own weights and measures to the impor-
tance of the fourth amendment. Of course, a body of law is emerging as
the Court decides more cases on the issue which, by the sheer diversity of
fact situations, should gradually clarify the factors of attenuation. If,
however, the raison d'etre of the exclusionary rule is effective deterrence of
fourth amendment violations, 3 then the Court must bring the lower
courts in line to a common standard by clearly delineating the relation-
ship among the three factors of the Brown test.
To determine whether the taint of an illegal arrest has been purged
under the Brown test, a court must find: whether sufficient time has
passed between the illegal arrest and the confession; whether an in-
dependent intervening event has broken the causal chain; and whether
the official misconduct was flagrant or purposeful.8 4 It is not clear
whether these factors are to be considered cumulatively or individually.
The Taylor majority examined each factor in isolation to see if it alone
would be sufficient to purge the taint of the illegal arrest. The dissent
accused the majority of attempting to "divide and conquer" the Brown
test by failing to consider the circumstances of the case as a whole.8 5
The dissent's criticism, however, was misplaced. The majority
82 United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (per curiam), ceri.
denied, 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
83 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
84 See supra text accompanying notes 42-50.
85 102 S. Ct. at 2673 n.7 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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presumed flagrant police misconduct from the initial fourth amendment
violation. It required a demonstrably effective break in the causal chain
between the arrest and the confession to refute the presumption of the
official misconduct.8 6 The dissent, on the other hand, examined the
facts from the perspective that the police misconduct was neither
flagrant nor purposeful, and it marshalled facts to support the admission
of the confession.8 7
The Court has decided whether various circumstances are sufficient
to break the chain of causation between an illegal arrest and a confes-
sion. In Wang Sun, release from police custody was sufficient. 88 In Brown,
Miranda warnings were insufficient. 89 In Johnson v. Louisiana, being
brought before a magistrate with counsel for a determination of prob-
able cause was sufficient.9° In Taylor, a visit with a girlfriend was insuffi-
cient,91 as was confrontation with fingerprint evidence obtained after an
illegal arrest. 92 The problem with such fact specific rules is that these
precedents provide little direction for determining and applying a man-
ageable standard of attenuation outside of those infrequent fact scena-
rios which resemble an already decided case. Certainly, the source of
the intervention must be beyond the instrumentality of the police.93 Yet
the question remains as to what sort of intervention attenuates the taint.
There appear to be two distinct standards. The higher standard is
that the intervening event must not itself cause the confession, but that
the confession must originate outside the aura of coercion that surrounds
the illegal detention. 94 The clearest example of this is Wang Sun, where
the defendant confessed only after leaving police custody and returning
voluntarily. The higher standard is the standard implicitly adopted by
the Taylor majority. Justice Marshall particularly doubted that Taylor's
visit with his girlfriend amounted to sufficient intervention because the
visit itself could have caused Taylor to confess. 95 The lower standard
86 Id. at 2667.
87 Id. at 2671 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
88 371 U.S. at 491.
89 422 U.S. at 603.
90 406 U.S. at 365.
91 102 S. Ct. at 2668.
92 Id. at 2669.
93 422 U.S. at 602. See supra note 60.
94 See supra note 48; Collins v. Beto, 348 F.2d 823, 835 (5th Cir. 1965) (Friendly, J., con-
curring) ("If the objective of obtaining maximum deterrence of arrests by state officers in
violation of the Fourth Amendment overrode all other considerations, a narrow test of what
breaks the causal chain would be appropriate in every case.").
95 102 S. Ct. at 2668 ("The State fails to explain how this five to ten minute visit, after
which petitioner immediately recanted his former statements that he knew nothing about the
robbery and signed the confession, could possibly have contributed to his ability to consider
carefully and objectivey his options and to exercise his ftee will.") (emphasis added).
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would permit a finding of attenuation if it is the intervention itself
which causes the defendant to confess. Justice O'Connor adopted this
standard in her dissent when she contended that the meeting should
have constituted an intevening circumstance because it, and not the ini-
tial illegality, caused Taylor to confess. 96
The higher standard, implicitly adopted by majority is both more
objective and less prone to manipulation because it requires a clear
showing that the defendant was outside of the influence of the police
custody for a significant amount of time. It ensures that the source of
the intervention is beyond the instrumentality of the police, and that it
is therefore beyond the reach of sophisticated prosecutorial argument.
The lower standard, on the other hand, encourages conjecture as to the
cause of the confession, and thus allows ample room for the courts to
marshal the facts to generate a plausible intervention. The lower stan-
dard has generally been applied when a defendant confesses because he
is confronted with evidence of a crime.97 One court even held that a
brief phone call was sufficient intervention to purge the taint of an ille-
gal arrest.98
Even though the Taylor majority applied the higher standard to the
facts, the lower courts will not necessarily follow its lead. The Supreme
Court limited its holding to the facts, and is not in a position to review
the many cases on the issue. To preserve the deterrent effectiveness of
the exclusionary rule and to effectuate the commands of the fourth
amendment, the Court should have clearly required the higher standard
for intervention that it itself applied.
The Taylor majority also left unclear how courts, in determining
whether the taint of the illegal arrest has been purged, should interpret
the flagrancy of the official misconduct. The facts in Taylor suggest that
the absence of malicious motivation on the part of the police should not
militate against suppression, since the majority refused to recognize a
"good faith" exception. Further, the Taylor decision suggests that if
there is any flagrantly unconstitutional behavior by government officials
beyond the actual fourth amendment violation, confessions must be sup-
pressed, in spite of arguable intervening circumstances, in order to deter
such official misconduct. These conclusions, however, must be gleaned
from the opinion because the majority did not explicitly set forth guide-
lines for the interpretation of the relevance of official misconduct.
96 Id. at 2672 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
97 See Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 91 (1963) (the defendant should be given an
opportunity to "show that his admissions were induced by being confronted with the illegally
seized evidence.").
98 E.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234 (5th Cir. 1978), aJdon rehearing, 612
F.2d 906, cert. denitd, 449 U.S. 835 (1980).
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In addition to the ambiguity in Brown, Dunaway, and Taylor on this
point-, several of the justices of the Court have themselves advocated the
adoption of a good faith exception.9 9 Justice Powell, concurring in part
in Brown, suggested distinguishing between differing degrees of fourth
amendment violations and applying a sliding threshold of attenuation
to each. t°0 At one end of Powell's sliding scale- would be cases in which
there is flagrantly unconstitutional behavior by government officials,101
based upon the officer's unreasonable ascertainment of probable cause,
or upon the use of the arrest as a pretext for collateral objectives.10 2 In
those cases, Powell would apply the traditional Brown test, requiring
some "demonstrably effective break in the chain of events," 10 3 e.g., in-
tervening circumstances previously acknowledged by the Court. 10 4 At
the other end of the scale, Powell would relegate purely "technical" vio-
lations where officers acted in violation of the fourth amendment, but
nonetheless did so reasonably and in good faith. 10 5 To admit a confes-
sion stemming from such a "technical" violation, Powell would require
no more than proof that the police gave the defendant effective warning
under Miranda.10 6
For support, Powell referred to Michigan v. Tucker:10 7 "The deterrent
purpose of the exclusionary rule necessarily assumes that the police have
engaged in willful, or at the very least negligent, conduct which was
deprived the defendant of some right."'' 08 Thus, the good faith proposal
rests on the behavioral assumption that there cannot be deterrence un-
99 See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. at 226 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 501 (1976) (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 538 (White, J., dissenting); Brown
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. at 609 (Powell, J., concurring in part); Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth
Amendment: The "Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionag Rule, 69 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
635, 635 (1978). See also United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542 (1975): "If the purpose of
the exclusionary rule is to deter unlawful police conduct then evidence obtained from a
search should be suppressed only if it can be said that the ... officer had knowledge, or may
properly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment." Clearly, this statement is not the bold proclamation that it appears to be since
all law enforcement officers are charged with knowledge of the Constitution, regardless of
their ignorance of it.
10o 422 U.S. at 609 (Powell, J., concurring in part) ("[T]he point at which the taint can be
said to have dissipated should be related ... to the nature of that taint.").
101 Id. at 610 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
102 Id. at 611 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
103 Id.
104 See Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972) (where the presentation of the defendant
before a magistrate for a finding of probable cause broke the causal connection between the
illegal arrest and the subsequent confession); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963)
(where release of the defendant from police custody broke the causal connection).
105 422 U.S. at 611 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
106 Id. at 612 (Powell, J., concurring in part).
107 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
108 422 U.S. at 612 (Powell, J., concurring in part) (quoting 417 U.S. at 447).
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less the person being deterred knows with certainty when he is acting
wrongly, and what the consequences of his misconduct will be. More-
over, Powell's good faith proposal seems to require a malice threshold
for invoking the Brown test; unless the police have acted with malice, the
confession will be admitted, unless, of course, the defendant had not
been given his Miranda rights. 109
Police officers who are.acting in reliance upon a holding or statute
which is later reversed or amended should not be penalized by the ex-
clusion of evidence thereby obtained. 110 Yet, the blanket adoption of a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule would be both unworkable
and ineffective, for three reasons. First, a good faith exception requires a
fact specific, case-by-case determination of whether to suppress evi-
dence. This would create a myriad of incomprehensible standards for
the police and the lower courts to follow."' Second, the good faith ex-
ception would diminish the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule,
both by increasing the uncertainty of its application, and by excusing
law enforcement officers from learning the commands of the fourth
amendment. 1 2 Third, the good faith exception utterly disregards the
right of the private citizen to be free from illegal searches and
seizures. 113
Proponents of the good faith exception contend that it is "grounded
in objective reasonableness,"' " 4 and requires a showing of bona fide
good faith on the part of the offending officer.' 15 Insertion of the phrase
"bona fide" before "good faith" hardly guarantees objectivity. The ap-
plication of a good faith exception would necessarily require a judicial
determination not only of the officer's conduct, but of his belief as
well. 116
The beliefs which will be scrutinized, however, will generally be fact-spe-
cific and it is doubtful that a ruling on one officer's belief will have any
relevance on the reasonableness of another officer's beliefs. Each court de-
ciding upon the reasonableness of a belief will engage in its own definition
109 "In cases in which this underlying premise [that only willful misconduct on the part of
the police can be deterred] is lacking, the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule does
not obtain, and I can see no legitimate justification for depriving the prosecution of reliable
and probative evidence." Id.
11o United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 542.
11l Schlag, Assaults on the Exclusionay Rule: Good Faith Limitations and Damage Remedies, 73 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 896-900 (1982).
112 Schlag, supra note 111, at 901.
113 Id. at 910.
114 Jensen & Hart, "The Good Faith Restatement of the Eclusionary Rule," 73 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 916, 929 (1982). See also Ball, supra note 91, at 635 ("[W]hen an officer acts in
the good faith belief that his conduct is constitutional and where he has a reasonable basis for
that belief, the exclusionary rule will not operate.").
115 Jensen & Hart, supra note 114, at 929.
116 Schlag, supra note 111, at 896.
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of reasonableness and then apply that standard to a belief which likely will
never be encountered again in any fourth amendment case.' 1 7
It is therefore not speculative to assume that the good faith exception,
by adding yet another factor to the already fact burdened Brown test,
would enhance the discretionary power of the trial judge and thus cast
further uncertainty into the application of the exclusionary rule.
The difficulty ofjudicial determination, however, is not sufficient to
repudiate the good faith exception. The ultimate test for any proposed
modification of the exclusionary rule is whether it would successfully
deter law enforcement officers from violating the commands of the
fourth amendment." 18 The good faith exception would diminish the de-
terrent effect of the exclusionary rule for two reasons. First, by requiring
a determination of the officer's state of mind at the time he or she vio-
lated the fourth amendment, a good faith exception would create a myr-
iad of fact specific decisions which would provide little guidance for an
officer in the field.
Whenever exceptions to the exclusionary rule are made, the deterrence ef-
fect of the rule is in one sense diminshed. The rule becomes harder to
understand, and the visitation of its consequences more uncertain ....
By complicating the message of its holding, an attempt to be exact in the
particular case may very well lead to confusion in general. . . .The de-
terrence value of the rule would be reduced because the ability of law of-
ficers to predict when the rule applies would be diminished.' 19
Unless the officer's actions were conspicuously flagrant, the result
would likely be a tacit affirmance of fourth amendment violations,1 20
because of the difficulty of proving scienter on the part of police, and
also because a great many police errors are simply the result of a lack of
experience, an excess of zeal, or both. 121 Deterrence would also be di-
minished because the good faith exception would likely "depress fourth
amendment compliance to the level of our tolerance for the lowest stan-
dards of the least informed officer. And there would be no incentive to
do better."'122 The good faith exception would judge the officer's con-
duct at the time of the violation. Hence, it ignores the fact that even if
officers act in good faith when they violate the fourth amendment, ex-
clusion of evidence thereby obtained will deter them from future viola-
117 Id.
118 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
119 Schlag, supra note 111, at 901.
120 Pitler, "The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIF. L. REV. 579,
584 (1968).
121 Id.
122 Bills to Limit the Exclusionary Rule in Federal Criminal Proceedings and to Eliminate and Estab-
lih a Damage Alternative to the Rule: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Law of the Senate




tions, and will spur them on to learn the necessary intricacies of the
fourth amendment. 23
Third, the good faith exception is utterly insensitive to the rights of
citizens to be secure from illegal searches and seizures. It would judge
the intrusion upon the privacy of the innocent and guilty alike, not on
the basis of the victim's response to the intrusion, nor on the basis of
whether the officer's conduct violated the fourth amendment, but solely
on what the officer believed' to be the implications of his actions. To the
victim of a fourth amendment violation it matters little whether or not
the officer acted in good faith. 124 Nowhere does the fourth amendment
speak of a law enforcement officer's belief in the rightness of his actions
in terms of mitigating the severity of the command that a person has the
right "to be secure. . . against unreasonable searches and seizures."'1 25
Proponents of the good faith exception argue that it would enhance the
public safety by denying the guilty an opportunity to be released when
the police err. A study made by the Comptroller General of the United
States shows that in only 1.3% of over 2,000 cases studied was evidence
excluded as a result of a fourth amendment motion.' 26 If a search or
seizure violates the fourth amendment it is per se unreasonable. Unless
the defendant admits, or acts in such a way as to indicate decisively,
that his or her confession was not the product of that illegality, then the
presumption against the admission of the confession should stand.
The Taylor decision, while providing ample grist for the detractors
of the exclusionary rule, does little in the way of setting the uniform
123 See Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionagv Rule: Deregulating
the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 401 (1981) ("even if prosecutors cannot
always find the time to explain the fourth amendment to the police, many of the larger police
departments hire legal counsel to make legal standards intelligible to the policeman on pa-
trol."). See also Kamisar, Is the ExclusionaV Rule an 'Illogical' or 'Unnatural' Interpretation of the
Fourth Amendment?, 62 JURICATURE 66, 70-72 (1978) (on the reluctance of the police to abide
by the commands of the fourth amendment).
[T]he constitutional status of the exclusionary rule rests not merely on the fact that the
rule deters misconduct, but also on the fact that the rule provides assurance that miscon-
duct is being deterred. Because the good faith type tests place so much confidence in the
ability of the courts to define and determine when a law enforcement agent has acted
upon a reasonable good faith (though erroneous) belief, these tests undermine the safe-
guard function of the exclusionary rule.
Schlag, supra note 111, at 914-15.
124 The flagrancy of the official misconduct is relevant.. . only insofar as it has a ten-
dency to motivate the defendant. A midnight arrest with drawn guns will be equally
frightening whether the police acted recklessly or in good faith. Conversely, a courteous
command has the same effect on the arrestee whether the officer thinks he has probable
cause or knows that he does not. In either event, if the Fourth Amendment is violated,
the admissibility question will turn on the causal relationship between that violation and
the defendant's subsequent confession.
442 U.S. at 220 (Stevens, J., concurring).
125 U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
126 COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, IMPACT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY
RULE ON FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS, REP. No. GGD-79-45 (1979).
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standards which are a prerequisite for effective deterrence. While the
Taylor majority refused to recognize a good faith exception, it still
deemed it necessary to characterize the police misconduct as "flagrant"
and "purposeful."1 27 Detractors of the exclusionary rule argue that if
the flagrancy of the official misconduct should be weighed heavily, then
non-flagrant violations should militate against suppression. In this light
the Taylor majority's decision not to recognize a good faith exception
falls short of a clear and effective repudiation.
In the absence of clearly controlling standards of attenuation, lower
courts have begun to construct their own alternatives. Most dramati-
cally, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc in United
States v. Williams,128 adopted a good faith exception in no uncertain
language:
[W]e now hold that evidence is not to be suppressed under the exclusion-
ary rule where it is discovered by officers in the course of actions that are
taken in good faith and in the reasonable, though mistaken, belief that
they are authorized. We do so because the exclusionary rule exists to deter
willful or flagrant actions by police, not reasonable, good-faith ones.129
The support for the holding in Williams was fourfold: First, the fifth
circuit contended that a wooden application of the exclusionary rule to
good faith mistakes cannot have its intended deterrent effect., 30 Second,
citing to dissenting opinions and dicta, the Williams court argued that
four of the Supreme Court justices have supported a good faith excep-
tion. 13' Third, the fifth circuit relied upon Supreme Court cases which
allowed for the admission of illegally obtained evidence in certain cir-
cumstances.1 32 Finally, the court cited to various commentators for
support. 133
127 102 S. Ct. at 2669.
128 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980).
129 Id. at 840. In Williams, the fruit of the illegal search was not a confession. An officer
made a warrantless search of a defendant jumping bail. Since violation of a bond condition is
not an offense for which the suspect can be arrested and searched without a warrant, the
defendant contended that the heroin uncovered in the search must be suppressed as the fruit
of the official illegality. Set also United States v. Miller, 666 F.2d 991 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
102 S. Ct. 2043 (1982).
130 The fifth circuit's reasoning echoed the familiar assertion that "a police officer will not
be deterred from an illegal search if he does not know that it is illegal." 622 F.2d at 842
(quoting Wright, Must the Criminal Go Free if the Constable Blunders?, 50 TEx. L. REV. 736, 740
(1972)).
131 622 F.2d at 841.
132 Id.
133 See, e.g., Wright, supra note 130, at 740; 622 F.2d at 849 (Rubin, J., specially concur-
ring). Rubin ascerbically commented that if four of the Supreme Court justices support a
good faith rule, that leaves a majority ofjustices who oppose it. Furthermore, it is clear that
the evidence in Williams would have been admitted notwithstanding the bold proclamation
of the good faith rule; the 'illegal' arrest was made in reliance upon a statute which was later
reconstrued. "The announcement of the rule as an alternative ground for decision in a case
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State courts and legislators have exploited the ambiguous attenua-
tion standard to advance a good faith exception. The New York Court
of Appeals recently allowed the admission of evidence that the police
had acquired in searching a home after reasonably relying upon the
consent of a party who was not a resident of the premises. 134 In 1981,
Colorado became the first state to pass legislation adopting a good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule. 135 Currently, several bills are pend-
ing before the United States Senate which advocate various versions of a
good faith exception.' 36 Most importantly, it appears that the United
States Supreme Court will be directly considering the merits of the good
faith exception in Illinois v. Gates.' 37
Still other courts, while not explicitly advancing a good faith excep-
tion, have avoided the exclusion of evidence by subtly altering the pre-
sumption against admission. These courts have emphasized that a
causal connection between the illegal arrest and the confession must be
proven in order to exclude the confession. 3 8 In State v. Barry 139 the New
Jersey Supreme Court recently allowed the admission of a confession of
a defendant allegedly involved in a policeman's murder.140 The court in
Barry placed great emphasis on the assertion that "[t]he facts, while
short of establishing probable cause for the. . . arrest of Edward Barry,
provide the basis for an innocent although unreasonable belief in its
where all the court agrees . . . virtually immunizes this case from Supreme Court review."
Id. at 851. As Judge Rubin predicted, the Court denied certiorari. 449 U.S. 1127 (1981).
134 People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 1, 422 N.E.2d 537, 439 N.Y.S.2d 877 (1981).
135 CoLo. REv. STAT. §16-3-308 (Supp. 1981).
136 S. 751, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (would abolish the exclusionary rule, but would
permit a tort action against the federal government for fourth amendment violations with
severely restricted damage limits); S. 101, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (would limit the cir-
cumstances under which evidence obtained illegally would be excluded).
137 Illinois v. Gates, 85 Ill. 2d 376, cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 997 (1982). The Court ordered
reargument on the following issue:
[T]he parties are requested to address the question whether the rule requiring the exclu-
sion at a criminal trial of evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment
should to any extent be modified, so as, for example, not to require the exclusion of
evidence obtained in the reasonable belief that the search and seizure at issue was consis-
tent with the Fourth Amendment.
Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 436, 436 (1982) (citations omitted).
138 See United States v. Bailey, 628 F.2d 938 (6th Cir. 1980); State v. Lehnen, 403 So. 2d
683, 686 (La. 1981).
139 86 N.J. 80, 429 A.2d 581, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1017 (1981).
140 The court held that the defendant's confrontation with the confessions of the co-con-
spirators and with the weapons used in commission of the crime were sufficient intervening
events to purge the taint of the illegal arrest. Justice Pashman noted in dissent that although
the Supreme Court has not yet defined "intervening circumstances," the decision in Barry was
a clear attempt to undermine the Court's holding in Brown. "[Nowhere do they suggest] that
mere confrontation with evidence. . . is sufficient to attenuate the taint of an illegal arrest."
Id. at 97, 429 A.2d at 589 (Pashman, J., dissenting).
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existence .... *41 In addition to this thinly veiled good faith argument,
the Barry court apparently placed the burden of proving taint upon the
defendant: "Statements following an illegal arrest must be excluded
only if they are causally related to the invasion of the suspect's
rights."1 42 The Taylor Court's failure to establish clear and manageable
guidelines for the interpretation of intervening circumstances and police
misconduct will further encourage lower courts to define their own
thresholds, and thereby subtly alter the presumption against the admis-
sion of tainted evidence.1 43
VI. ALTERNATIVES AND CONCLUSIONS
The Court in Taylor v. Alabama affirmed a vigilant conception of the
exlusionary rule insofar as it applied the Brown test in a manner sensitive
to the imperative of deterring fourth amendment violations. Yet the
Court did not provide the guidelines necessary to ensure that other
courts will apply the test in a like manner. The haphazard application
of the Brown test has created the kind of uncertainty which is inconsis-
tent with effective deterrence. Because application of the Brown test is
highly fact specific, manageable standards are nonexistent. It might be
years before the courts and the police will begin to have a reasonable
idea of what constitutes attenuation in the multitudinous fact scenarios
possible in fourth amendment cases. The likelihood of effective deter-
rence has been further diminished because the absence of manageable
standards has encouraged courts to set up their own rules. Though the
Taylor majority refused to recognize a good faith exception, the fifth
circuit has capitalized on the ambiguous standard of attenuation in or-
der to advocate just such an exception. By excusing law enforcement
officers from learning the commands of the fourth amendment, and by
generating a plethora of fact specific decisions, a good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule will undermine its deterrent effect, and leave the
fourth amendment guarantee against illegal searches and seizures an
empty shell.
While some commentators have suggested various alternative
methods of enforcing police compliance with the fourth amendment, 144
141 Id. at 90, 429 A.2d at 585.
142 Id. at 89, 429 A.2d at 585.
143 United States v. Rodriguez, 585 F.2d 1234 (5th Cir. 1978), a'don rehearing, 612 F.2d
906, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 835 (1980) (a phone call made by the defendant from the police
station was held to be sufficient intervention); Commonwealth v. Bradshaw, 385 Mass. 244,
431 N.E.2d 880 (1982) (a statement made to the defendant by the defendant's "friend," who
was working with the prosecution, was sufficient intervention).
144 For a thorough analysis of the various alternatives, see Geller, Enforc:zg the Fourth Amend-
ment: The Exc/usionag Rule and Its Alternatives, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 621, 684-722. See also Da-
vidow, Criminal Procedure Ombudsman Revisited, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 939 (1982)
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many of the exclusionary rule's harshest critics acknowledge the ineffec-
tiveness of the proposed alternatives. 145 The exclusionary rule, while
problematic, is apparently the fairest and most effective way to deter
fourth amendment violations. 146 Had the Taylor majority clearly modi-
fied the Brown test by establishing a high standard for intervention and
severely limiting the relevance of the flagrancy of the official miscon-
duct, the result would more effectively deter fourth amendment viola-
tions. 147 Unfortunately, since the Taylor Court did not so clarify the
interpretive ambiguities of the Brown test, application of the exclusion-
ary rule in cases where confessions may be tainted by illegal arrests will
remain inconsistent and the deterrent effect will continue to be
dissipated.
WILLIAM D. LEVINSON
(suggests providing "an independent government official . . . who would investigate in-
stances of alleged police misconduct, publicize the results of such investigations, and author-
ize the appointment of private counsel . . . to sue the offending official . . . when the
ombudsman found probable cause to believe that an aggrieved person had been subjected to
a deprivation of constitutional rights"). But see Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 420-21 (1971) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) ("I can see no
insuperable obstacle to the elimination of the suppression doctrine if Congress would provide
some meaningful and effective remedy against unlawful conduct by government offi-
cials. . . . I do not propose, however, that we abandon the suppression doctrine until some
meaningful alternative can be developed.").
145 See McGarr, The Excusionag, Rule: An II Conceived and Ine.Jective Remedy, 52 J. CRIM. L.
CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 266, 268 (1961). But see Schlag, supra note 111, at 888 (Cer-
tainly one can conceive of any number of deterrents that might be as effective as the exclu-
sionary rule; the problem is that such deterrents would impose other grave costs on society).
t46 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961).
t47 Perhaps the Taylor majority intended to do this, since it held the visit to Taylor was
insufficient intervention, and that, though the police misconduct was characterized as "fla-
grant," it was not nearly as deliberate as the police misconduct in Brown and JDunaway. In a
searing dissent in Rawlings, Justice Marshall eloquently warned:
A slow and steady erosion of the ability of victims of unconstitutional searches and
seizures to obtain a remedy for the invasion of their rights saps the constitutional guaran-
tee ofits life just as surely as would a substantive limitation. Because we are called on to
decide whether evidence should be excluded only when a search has been 'successful,' it
is easy to forget that the standards we announce determine what government conduct is
reasonable in searches and seizures directed at persons who turn out to be innocent as
well as those who are guilty.
448 U.S. at 121 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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